The Kerberos Authentication System

The Kerberos Authentication System. Brad Karp UCL Computer Science. CS GZ03 / M030 17 th November, 2008. Why Study Kerberos?. One of most widely used authentication systems, implemented in many, many UNIXes for a variety of services

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The Kerberos Authentication System

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The KerberosAuthentication System Brad Karp UCL Computer Science CS GZ03 / M030 17th November, 2008
Why Study Kerberos? • One of most widely used authentication systems, implemented in many, many UNIXes for a variety of services • Simple example of use of cryptography to solve practical authentication problems • Imperfect; weaknesses instructive
Kerberos: Goals • Authentication of diverse entities, for diverse services: • Users, client machines, server machines • File systems, remote login, file transfer, printing, &c. • Authentication in an “open environment” • Users may be superuser on their own workstations (so may adopt any user ID if credentials over network unauthenticated); hardware not centrally controlled • Same user population may use many machines and services (e.g., labs of public-access machines on a campus) • Drop-in replacement of passwords for pre-existing protocols • Convenient;strength of security?
Kerberos Model: Central Authority • Within a site (e.g., MIT), a central database server stores names and secret keys for all principals • Keys are for 56-bit DES symmetric-key cipher • Now brute-forceable; more reasonable at time of Kerberos’ first use (1988) • All users and machines are principals, named with human-readable names • All principals trust central database server
Kerberos Principal Names • Users: e.g., bkarp • Can have instances; sub-names of a principal, e.g., bkarp.mail, bkarp.root • Machines: e.g., boffin, arkell, sonic • Services: e.g., rlogin.sonic (instance of the rlogin service running on sonic) • Site name: realm; all machines in one administrative domain share one central Kerberos database, in same realm • name.instance@realm, e.g., bkarp@UCL.AC.UK
Kerberos Protocol • Goal: mutually authenticated communication • Two principals wish to communicate • Principals know each other by name in central database • Kerberos establishes shared secret between the two • Can use shared secret to encrypt or MAC subsequent communication • [Few “Kerberized” services encrypt, and none MAC!] • Approach: leverage keys shared with central database • Central database trusted by/has keys for all principals
Kerberos Credentials • Client can either be user or machine, depending on context • To talk to server s, client c needs shared secret key and ticket: • Session key: Ks,c (randomly generated by central database) • Ticket:T = Ks (where Ks is key s shares with database) • Only server s can decrypt ticket
Kerberos Credentials (2) • Given ticket, client creates authenticator: • Authenticator:A = Ks,c • Client must know Ks,c to create authenticator • Authenticator can only be used once • Client presents both ticket T and authenticator A to server when requesting an operation • T convinces server that Ks,c was given to c • A intended to prevent replay of requests • “Kerberized” protocols use authenticator in place of password
Getting the User’s First Ticket • User logs in at console with username and password (username is Kerberos name) • Kerberized login program retrieves initial ticket for user: • Client machine sends to Kerberos database:c, tgs (tgs is principal name for ticket-granting service) • Server responds with:Ktgs>Kc • whereTc,tgs = tgs, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime, Kc,tgs • Client decrypts server’s response withKc = H(password)
Requesting a Service • Client c (e.g., user bkarp) wishes to use a service on s, already holds Kc,tgs • Client requests ticket from tgs as follows: • Client sends to tgs:s, Ktgs, Kc,tgs • tgs replies to client with ticket for service on that server:Ks,Kc,s>Kc,tgs • where Kc,s is a new, randomly generated session key for use between c and s
Using a Service • Once client holds ticket for service, uses it with authenticator to request operation from server: • Client sends to s:service name, Ks,Kc,s • Server validates Tc,s and Ac, and executes operation if they are valid • Server uses timestamps and expiration times to invalidate stale, “future”, replayed requests
Kerberos: Summary of Message Flow • Request for TGS ticket: c, tgs • Ticket for TGS: Ktgs>Kc • Request for Server ticket: s, Ktgs, Kc,tgs • Ticket for Server: Ks,Kc,s>Kc,tgs • Request for Service: service name, Ks,Kc,s KDC TGS 3 2 4 1 User/ Client 5 Server
Ticket Lifetime • How should we choose ticket lifetimes? • Convenience: longer ticket-granting ticket lifetime user must type password less often • Performance: longer service ticket lifetime client must request new service ticket less often • Risk: longer ticket lifetime lengthens period when ticket can be stolen, abused • MIT Athena implementation destroys ticket-granting ticket when user logs out
Kerberos Security Weaknesses • Vulnerability to replay attacks • Reliance on synchronized clocks across nodes • Storage of tickets on workstations • No way to change compromised password securely • Key database focal point for attack • Hard to upgrade key database (relied on by all nodes in system)
Kerberos User Inconveniences • Large (e.g., university-wide) administrative realms: • University-wide admins often on critical path • Departments can’t add users or set up new servers • Can’t develop new services without central admins • Can’t upgrade software/protocols without central admins • Central admins have monopoly servers/services (can’t set up your own without a principal) • Rigid; what if user from realm A wants to authenticate himself to host at realm B? • Ticket expirations • Must renew tickets every 12-23 hours • How to create long-running background jobs?

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